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Abstract As a consequence of the growing popularity of smart mobile devices,
mobile malware is clearly on the rise, with attackers targeting valuable user infor-
mation and exploiting vulnerabilities of the mobile ecosystems. With the emergence
of large-scale mobile botnets, smartphones can also be used to launch attacks on mo-
bile networks. The NEMESYS project will develop novel security technologies for
seamless service provisioning in the smart mobile ecosystem, and improve mobile
network security through better understanding of the threat landscape. NEMESYS
will gather and analyze information about the nature of cyber-attacks targeting mo-
bile users and the mobile network so that appropriate counter-measures can be taken.
We will develop a data collection infrastructure that incorporates virtualized mobile
honeypots and a honeyclient, to gather, detect and provide early warning of mobile
attacks and better understand the modus operandi of cyber-criminals that target mo-
bile devices. By correlating the extracted information with the known patterns of
attacks from wireline networks, we will reveal and identify trends in the way that
cyber-criminals launch attacks against mobile devices.
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1 Introduction
Smart devices have gained significant market share in the mobile handset and per-
sonal computer markets, and this trend is expected to continue in the near future.
Smartphone shipments were 43.7% of all handset shipments in 2012, and smart-
phones’ share in the handset market is expected to grow to 65.1% in 2016 [5]. Fur-
thermore, while smartphones represented only 18% of total global handsets in use
in 2012, they were responsible for 92% of total global handset traffic [6]. Therefore,
smart devices evidently have a central role in the current and future mobile land-
scape. The growing popularity of smart mobile devices, Android and iOS devices
in particular [22], has not gone unnoticed by cyber-criminals, who have started to
address these smart mobile ecosystems in their activities. Smart mobiles are highly
attractive targets since they combine personal data such as lists of contacts, social
networks, and, increasingly, financial data and security credentials for online bank-
ing, mobile payments and enterprise intranet access, in a frequently used and always
connected device. While most users are aware of security risks with using a tradi-
tional PC or laptop and therefore are more cautious, smart mobile devices have been
found to provide a false sense of security [33], which exacerbates the mobile risk.
Smart devices also provide access to mobile networks for cyber-criminals and
attackers to cross service and network boundaries by exploiting the vulnerabilities
of the multiple communication technologies that smart devices have. Evolution of
the mobile networks also introduces additional vulnerabilities, for example via the
adoption of new radio access technologies such as femtocells [18]. Although the
use of femtocells and other complementary access is recent and not yet widespread,
their effect should not be underestimated. For example in 2012, 429 petabytes per
month of global mobile data was offloaded onto the fixed network through Wi-Fi
or femtocell radio access, which accounts for 33% of total mobile traffic [6]. Mo-
bile devices are also increasingly at the center of security systems for managing
small or large emergencies in built environments, or during sports or entertainment
events [14,17], and they are used increasingly for online search of difficult-to-get
sensitive information [2,11]. Thus they will necessarily be targeted and breached in
conjunction with other physical or cyber attacks, as a means of disrupting safety and
confidentiality of individuals and emergency responders [19–21].
The ability of smart devices to install and run applications from official stores
and third-party application markets has significantly increased the mobile malware
threat [9,36]. While the mobile malware threat is not new [7], it is decidedly evolv-
ing and growing as attackers experiment with new business models by targeting
smart mobile users [28,32]. For example, the number of detected malware was more
than 35,0001 in 2012, which reflects a six-fold increase from 2011 [32]. 2012 has
also seen the emergence of the first mobile botnets [29]. A botnet is a collection of
Internet-connected devices acting together to perform tasks, often under the control
of a command and control server. Most malicious botnets are used to generate var-
1 This number is for Android alone, which accounts for 99% of all encountered malware in
2012 [29].
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ious forms of spam, phishing, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. In
addition to giving cyber-criminals the advantages of control and adaptability, mobile
botnets are also a significant threat to the mobile core network as they could be used
to launch debilitating signaling-based DDoS attacks [23,34]. In order to address the
growing mobile threat, there is an urgent need to detect, analyze and understand
the new vulnerabilities and threats in the smart mobile ecosystem. These new vul-
nerabilities and threats are a result of the evolution of mobile networks and smart
devices, the changing way users interact with technology, the popularity of smart
devices, and the heterogeneity of the wireless interfaces, supported platforms and
offered services. We need to be proactive and work on predicting threats and vul-
nerabilities to build our defenses before threats materialize in order to advance in
the fast moving field of cyber-security and to counter existing and potential mobile
threats. In the next section, the approach adopted in the NEMESYS project for this
purpose is described.
Thus the EU FP7 research project NEMESYS2 will develop a novel security
framework for gathering and analyzing information about the nature of cyber-
attacks targeting mobile devices and the mobile core network, as well as the iden-
tification and prediction of abnormal behaviours observed on smart mobile devices
so that appropriate countermeasures can be taken to prevent them. We aim to under-
stand the modus operandi of cyber-criminals, and to identify and reveal the possible
shift in the way they launch attacks against mobile devices through root cause anal-
ysis and correlation of new findings with known patterns of attacks on wireline
networks.
2 The Data Collection Infrastructure
Figure 1 shows the system architecture that will be developed within the NEMESYS
project. The core of the NEMESYS architecture consists of a data collection infras-
tructure (DCI) that incorporates a high-interaction honeyclient and interfaces with
virtualized mobile honeypots (VMHs) in order to gather data regarding mobile at-
tacks. The honeyclient and VMHs collect mobile attack traces and provide these
to the DCI, which are then enriched by analysis of the data and by accessing re-
lated data from the mobile core network and external sources. For example, TCP/IP
stack fingerprinting in order to identify the remote machine’s operating system, and
clustering of the traces are passive methods of data enrichment. DNS reverse name
lookup, route tracing, autonomous system identification, and geo-localization are
methods to improve characterization of remote servers which may require access
to external sources, possibly in real time. The enriched mobile attack data is made
available to anomaly detection module, and the visualization and analysis module
(VAM) running on the mobile network operator site.
2 http://www.nemesys-project.eu/nemesys/index.html
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Fig. 1 The NEMESYS architecture
As an initial step in the design of the DCI, we are identifying available external
data sources relating to wireline network attacks which will enable correlation of
attack-related data coming from multiple heterogeneous sources. Different sources
of information that NEMESYS partners maintain and have access to will be used for
this purpose, for example SGNET [25], HARMUR [24], and VirusTotal. A source
aggregator will be designed and developed to harvest and consolidate data from
these sources, and the honeyclient and VMHs, in a scalable database. Scalable de-
sign of the database is important in order to be able to efficiently store and handle
large heterogeneous data sets. As a final step, the DCI will help in the definition of
the appropriate inputs representing normal and malicious network activity, which
will then be used as the fundamental representation of information in the VAM.
The honeyclient being developed as part of the DCI is responsible for interact-
ing with web servers to find websites with malicious content targeting mobile users,
and for collecting related mobile threat data. The honeyclient consists of the crawler,
client, and detector components. The crawler will generate a list of websites of inter-
est for the client to visit. The client component will run an Android emulator which
will generate, queue, and execute the requests corresponding to each discovered
website, and record traces of changes in the system state that occur as a result. The
malware detector component will be used to detect malicious content. Data relat-
ing to identified malicious websites will be provided to the DCI by the honeyclient,
which is described in more detail in [8].
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3 Virtualized Mobile Honeypots
We adopt the high-interaction virtualized mobile client honeypot scheme in order to
attract and collect mobile attack traces. Honeypots are networked computer system
elements that are designed to be attacked and compromised so we can learn about
the methods employed by the attackers [31]. Traditional honeypots are servers that
passively wait to be attacked, whereas client honeypots are security devices that ac-
tively search for malware, compromised websites and other forms of attacks. High-
interaction client honeypots are fully functional, realistic client systems which do
not impose any limitations on the attacker other than those required for containing
the attack within the compromised system. Despite their complexity and difficulty of
maintenance, high-interaction client honeypots are effective at detecting unknown
attacks, and are harder to detect by the attacker [31]. They also enable in-depth
analysis of the attacks during and after the attack has taken place.
In NEMESYS, we are developing a high-interaction virtualized client honeypot
for the Android mobile platform. We have chosen Android considering its popularity
among mobile users and the extremely high ratio of malware targeting Android [4,
29]. We are developing a virtualization technology that addresses the problems we
have identified in the system- and application-level security mechanisms of Android
and enables secure support for new schemes of smart device use such as “bring your
own device” [26]. Our virtualization technology logically partitions the physical
device into two virtual machines (VMs): the honeypot VM and the infrastructure
VM. The honeypot VM will host the largely unmodified mobile device operating
system, and it will not have direct access to the device’s communication hardware.
The infrastructure VM will mediate all access to the communication hardware, and
employ sensors to wiretap any communication and detect suspicious behaviour. It
will also provide the event monitoring, logging and filesystem snapshot facilities,
as well as transmit threat information to the DCI. It will host a lightweight malware
detection module in order to identify malicious applications running on the honeypot
VM. For this purpose, both signature-based and behaviour-based approaches will be
considered. In order to improve the efficiency of malware detection, we will identify
and prioritize the most important attributes in the system state space to monitor.
Our virtualization technology will ensure that an attack is confined within the
compromised device so that it will not put other devices in the network at risk. It will
also stop malware from using premium rate services and from subscribing the user
to services without her knowledge. Thus, the user will be spared from any financial
distress that may arise as a result of using the mobile honeypot. The virtualization
solution also enables taking full snapshots of the honeypot VM filesystem for further
forensic analysis of an attack, as well as improving honeypot maintenance since a
compromised honeypot could be restored more quickly.
Current IP-based attacks encountered on mobile devices [35] have been found to
be largely similar to non-mobile devices [10,15], but we are more interested in the
traits of attacks that are tailored specifically for mobile devices. Our initial research
has shown that the infection vector of most mobile malware is social engineering,
where users are “tricked” into installing the malware themselves. Upcoming mal-
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ware will also employ attack vectors that require interaction with the user; for ex-
ample, we have already witnessed the first malicious QR codes, which need to be
scanned by the user for their activation. These observations have led us to the con-
clusion that the user should not be ignored in the construction of an effective mobile
honeypot. To this end, we introduce the nomadic honeypot concept [27], which uti-
lizes real smartphone hardware running the virtualization solution being developed
by NEMESYS. We plan to deploy nomadic honeypots by handing them out to a cho-
sen group of volunteers, who will use the honeypot as their primary mobile device.
It will be up to these human users to get the honeypot infected by visiting malicious
sites, installing dubious applications, etc. Traces from malware and other types of
mobile attacks collected by the honeypots will be provided to the DCI.
4 Anomaly Detection Using Control Plane and Billing Data
The purpose of the anomaly detection mechanisms is to identify and predict devi-
ations from normal behaviour of mobile users and the core network. These mech-
anisms will utilize Charging Data Records (CDR) of the users and control-plane
protocol data, together with enriched mobile attack traces provided by the DCI. In
addition to attacks targeting mobile users, mobile networks are vulnerable to a novel
DoS attack called the signaling attack [23], which seeks to overload the control
plane of the mobile network using low-rate, low-volume attack traffic by exploiting
the structure and characteristics of mobile networks, for example by repeatedly trig-
gering radio channel allocations and revocations. We will use control-plane protocol
data such as traces of signaling events in order to identify such DoS attacks against
the mobile network. Sanitized (anonymized) billing data will mostly be used to
identify attacks targeting mobile users. For these purposes, we will use normal user
behaviour statistics, as well as synthetic “typical” user playbacks, to create traces of
signaling events and CDRs so as to characterize and extract their principal statistics
such as frequencies, correlations, times between events, and possible temporal ten-
dencies over short (milliseconds to seconds) and long (hours to days) intervals. We
will employ Bayesian techniques such as maximum likelihood detection, neuronal
techniques based on learning, and a combination of these two in order to design and
develop robust and accurate change detection algorithms to detect the presence of
an attack, and classification algorithms to identify with high confidence the type of
attack when it is detected. Novel femtocell architectures provide a specific oppor-
tunity for user-end observation of network usage, while they also have specifics for
attacks within the femtocells. To address femtocell-specific attacks, we will conduct
a survey and evaluation of how users may be monitored and attacks detected within
a femtocell, and how these are linked to overall mobile network events.
In these environments a number of novel ideas are being exploited. The structure
of the signaling and billing network is being modeled as a queueing network [16]
to capture the main events that involve hundreds of thousands of mobile calls and
interactions among which only a few may be subject to an intrusion or attack at any
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given time. Detection of abnormalities is studied using learning techniques based
on neural network models [12,13] that can provide the fast low-order polynomial
or linear detection complexity required from the massive amount of real-time data,
and the need to detect and respond to threats in real-time. Such techniques can also
benefit from distributed task decomposition and distributed execution for greater
efficiency [3]. Our approach to anomaly detection is discussed in more detail in [1].
5 Root Cause Analysis, Correlation and Visualization
Enriched attack traces and mobile network data collected by the DCI, and the output
of the anomaly detection modules are fed into the visualization and analysis mod-
ule (VAM). The VAM’s purpose is to aid the detection of existing and emerging
threats in the mobile ecosystem through attack attribution, root cause identification,
and correlation of observed mobile attacks with known attack patterns. The data
provided to the VAM represents a large and heterogeneous data set that needs to
be presented in a meaningful way to the security analyst without overwhelming her
or restricting available views and actions on the data. In addition to mere represen-
tation of data, the VAM aims to provide visual analytics tools to the analyst. This
task is compounded by different uses of visualization: (i) real-time monitoring of
the status of mobile users and the mobile network, and (ii) exploratory data analy-
sis. For real-time monitoring, the security status of a large set of mobile users, and
more importantly the mobile network, need to be presented. This includes provid-
ing early alerts for abnormal behaviour, DoS attacks, malware spreading among the
users of the mobile network, etc. The VAM must also provide visual analytics tools
so the analyst can perform hypothesis formulation and testing, attack attribution,
and correlation analysis, with the help of algorithms running in the background.
In order to effectively visualize and explore large sets of heterogeneous, dynamic,
complex data, it is necessary to create multiple coordinated views of the data that
allow a multi-faceted perception and the discovery of any hidden attributes. The
analysis methods also need to be scalable for early network alerts and fast access to
the underlying data. We will therefore focus on enabling a real-time analysis frame-
work by means of incremental analysis and visualization methods, such as multi-
level hierarchical screen visualizations that update smoothly rather than showing
abrupt changes. Visualization of mobile network data is discussed in more detail
in [30].
6 Conclusions
In the NEMESYS Project, we will address and understand the new and potential
vulnerabilities, threats, and operating methods of cyber-criminals, and provide new
insight into next generation network security for the smart mobile ecosystem. We
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will contribute to the research novel security technologies for the identification and
prediction of abnormal behavior observed on smart mobile devices, and to the gath-
ering and analyzing of information about cyber-attacks that target mobile devices, so
that countermeasures can be taken. We will develop virtualized honeypots for mo-
bile devices, a data collection infrastructure, and novel attack attribution and visual
analytics technologies for mining, presentation of large amounts of heterogeneous
data regarding the smart mobile ecosystem.
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